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1. The Department and its strawman. 
The Department's pretense that plaintiff's claim against it is for "negligent design" 
worked so well with the lower court that it just can't give it up, even here and even· after 
plaintiff's opening brief. The Department declares, as the fIrst proposition of its "Statement of 
Facts": 
"The Appellant alleges that Nampa and the State negligently failed to ... design. 
. . for public convenience and safety that portion of the state highway system 
known as Eleventh Avenue North and, more particularly, the intersection .... " 
Respondent's Brief at 5, emphasis added. For the source of that counterfeit, it asks us to "See, 
e.g., R., at 8." Let us see, then: Nope; not so much as a suggestion "at 8" or anywhere else in the 
record that plaintiff ever sued the Department for negligence arising out of its 1954 design of the 
intersection. And for the umpteenth time in this case, plaintiff again "confesses" that the 1954 
design was adequate; was done in conformance with the engineering standards that were in effect 
at the time and - to satisfy the Department's and the lower court's insistence that an "approved" 
design works for purposes of § 6-904(7)'s design immunity, too - plaintiff accepts that the 
design was suitably "approved," too. 
The Department next resorts to a play on words: Quoting the complaint's allegation of 
an absence of warnings, it puts the word "designed" in italics when the context obviously made it 
synonymous with "intended": 
"As of the date of the accident giving rise to the Complaint, the Intersection 'still 
had no traffic control devices, warnings or markings designed [italics supplied by 
defense counsel] to benefIt the safety of pedestrians .... '" 
Respondent's Brief at 8. Neat, but again misleading. 
With that, the focus of the Court is again invited to the true question before it: Does the 
perpetual and immutable immunity for design of a highway mean the authority responsible for 
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its safety can never be sued for failure to fmd hazards and put up warnings, since it can always 
say, "Our ancient design included the non-installation of warnings"? Plaintiff again emphasizes 
Leliefelds contrary holding: 
The construction we place upon § 6-904(8) [now (7)] does not preclude a finding 
of liability founded upon a failure to warn of a dangerous condition. McClure, 
supra; Gavica, supra. 
104 Idaho at 369, 659 P.2d at 123, emphasis added. The dangerous condition the authority 
failed to warn of there was the narrowness of the bridge as designed and constructed. Were the 
Department's argument here sound, there would be no purpose for any of the myriad statutory 
impositions of duty --- the Department would simply be placed under a duty to design in 
accordance with standards in effect at the time 1 and that would be it. There would be no 
continuing duty to erect warnings, ever, to advise of later-developing, known dangerous 
conditions, because "warnings weren't included in the design; thus we are immune." Leliefeld, as 
noted above and in plaintiffs opening brief, holds otherwise and defeats the Department's 
argument, which incidentally, presumes duty and breach thereof: 
"Furthermore, it is clear the State could have non-delegable duties relating to the 
crosswalk at issue in this lawsuit, yet still enjoy immunity under Idaho Code §6-
904(7). Indeed, 'duty' is implicit in the concept of immunity statutes, which 
immunizes [emphasis original] a party for a breach of a duty [emphasis original], 
provided the immunity statute's requirements are met." 
Respondent's Brief at 13, emphasis added except as noted otherwise. Defendant's irrelevant 
immunity for its 1954 design, which isn't in issue, does nothing to excuse its subsequent breach 
of the duty to study for, find and warn of dangerous conditions. Leliefeld, supra. 
The Department's continued assertion of Lawton and Brown remains ineffectual: In 
those cases, as addressed in plaintiffs opening brief, the plaintiff had sued for negligent design. 
1 "Or" approved, as the Department and the lower court insist. 
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2. The Department has no response for the fact its "HAL" observation program 
contributes nothing at all to this case. 
In his opening brief, plaintiff exposed the Department's "HAL" defense as vacuous: not 
one shred of evidence in the record said one thing about "funding" or the limits thereof, arid the 
"HAL" program itself is by its terms nothing more than a kind of surveyor inventory. It doesn't 
contain any policy relevant to the issues here; it doesn't contain any directives relevant to the 
issues here and it doesn't contain one single word on the order of "the Department shall make 
reasonably safe only the locations listed herein, because that's all the money we have." Nor 
could it, obviously, because nothing in "HAL" contains one word or figure regarding what it 
would cost to make any of those locations reasonably safe, either. And while the lower court 
was apparently awed bycthe appearance of HAL as "thorough and complicated," R. 346-348, the 
same could be said for the Department's website. But is there anything of any substance in 
HAL about corrections to be made, or about cost to make safe either by cure or by warning, or 
about funding, or about "the limit of available funding" or about the duties imposed by I.C. §40-
201? Absolutely not. The Department's argument simply sounded good, and the lower court 
agreed. Nowhere in the Department's brief is there even an attempt to show otherwise. 
3. The Department's "Hail Mary Pass" falls incomplete. 
Arriving at the last ditch with nothing better than strawmen, wordplay and "HAL," the 
Department lobs the following: 
"The Trial Court did not err in ruling that the Appellant failed to submit facts 
demonstrating a triable issue. Although the Trial Court acknowledged that the 
Appellant asserted that accidents had occurred at the Intersection, and that the 
City of Nampa modified the Intersection after the Appellant's accident, it pointed 
out the Appellant did not create a genuine issue of material fact on the relevant 
issue of 'whether or not [1] the State complied with its own program for this 
particular intersection or that [2] it has otherwise been negligent [3] in light of the 
limitations as to funding that is built into the duties by I.C. 40-201.'" 
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Respondent's Brief at 16-17. 
As to the lower court's first proposition, plaintiff responds that he never made any issue 
of the Department's "compliance with its own program for this particular intersection" because 
the only "program" it raised was the "HAL" inventory, which had nothing to do with anything, as 
previously explained. As for the lower court's assertion plaintiff didn't create a genuine issue of 
material fact as to the Department's negligence "otherwise," the lower court was simply ignoring 
the affidavit of plaintiffs expert Edward Stevens, R. p. 290-291; the engineering study done by 
Nampa's retained, third party expert consultant Stephen J. Lewis, R., p. 189-194; and the 
deposition of Nampa's Public Works Director, Michael Fuss, R., 227-255. Simply ignoring the 
non-moving party's submissions does not negate their existence. As for the lower court's third 
proposition, concerning the "limitations as to funding that is built into the duties by I.e. 40-201," 
plaintiff again notes there was never so much as a fleck of evidence in the record concerning 
funding. The sole source of the "funding" remarks was defense counsel's hand waving and the 
lower court's acceptance of it. 
Conclusion. 
For all of the foregoing reasons and those set forth in plaintiffs opening brief, the entry of 
summary judgment for the Department must be reversed and the case remanded for further 
proceedings. 
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